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THE NATION'S WAR ON
DRUGS?
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct.
1384 (1989).
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 21, 1989, the United States Supreme Court upheld
suspicionless drug testing of certain employees within the Customs
Service.' In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Court
held that the fourth amendment 2 does not prohibit the Customs
Service from requiring employees seeking promotions or transfers
to positions involving drug interdiction or the carrying of a firearm
to take a urinalysis drug test without any individualized or genera-
lized suspicion of drug use by Customs employees. 3 This Note ex-
amines the Von Raab opinions and concludes that the Court unduly
relied on the noncriminal context of the urinalysis testing in justify-
ing its departure from the usual requirements of probable cause and
reasonable suspicion. This Note argues that even in a noncriminal
context, the Court must first demonstrate special circumstances
which render these traditional standards impracticable before em-
ploying the balancing of interests methodology. This Note further
demonstrates that the Court failed to discount the benefits of suspi-
cionless urinalysis testing by the absence of any drug problem
within the Customs work force and consequently erroneously in-
flated the benefits of such testing. Moreover, this Note contends
that the Customs Service's drug testing program is ineffective and
hence unreasonable because employees control the occurrence and
timing of the drug test. Finally, this Note discusses the ramifications
I National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
2 For the relevant text of the fourth amendment, see infra note 170 and accompany-
ing text.
3 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1397.
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of the Von Raab decision and how it specifically extends to other
categories of employees.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the summer of 1986, the United States Customs Service im-
plemented a drug testing program applicable to current employees
tentatively selected for transfer or promotion to certain "sensitive"
positions. 4 Sensitive positions were positions which involved the in-
terdiction of drugs, the carrying of a firearm, or the access to classi-
fied information. 5 Under the drug testing program, an employee's
promotion or transfer to any of these positions was contingent upon
the successful completion of a urinalysis drug test.6
The Service's urinalysis testing was not restricted to employees
suspected of using or selling drugs.7 Moreover, the program was
not implemented in response to any generalized drug problem
within the Customs Service.8 In fact, in the five months of drug test-
ing prior to the district court's enjoining of the program, no Cus-
toms employee seeking a promotion to a sensitive position tested
positive for drugs. 9 Additionally, Commissioner Von Raab noted
that "the Customs Service has been known throughout the law en-
forcement community as an agency whose employees demonstrate
noteworthy integrity."' 0 Nonetheless, the Commissioner stressed
that the drug program is justified in light of the Service's special
interest in ensuring a drug-free work force."I
Under the program, any employee whose application for pro-
motion is tentatively approved will receive advance notice that his
promotion is contingent upon successful completion of the drug
test.12 Within five days thereafter, a private company contacts the
4 Id. at 1388. The Service also implemented a drug screening program under which
applicants for, initial employment were tested. However, since no applicant for initial
employment is a party to this suit, the constitutionality of the pre-employment drug
program was not before the Court. Brief for the Petitioner at 3 n.1, Von Raab (No. 86-
1879).




8 Id. at 1387-88. Commissioner Von Raab of the Customs Service stated that he
"'believe[s] that Customs [is] largely drug-free,' that '[t]he extent of illegal drug use by
Customs employees was not the reason for establishing this program,' and that he
'hope[s] and expect[s] to receive reports of very few positive findings through drug
screening.'" Id. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
9 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Von Raab (No. 86-1879).
10 Id.
l Ild.
12 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1388.
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employee to schedule a time for the urinalysis test. 13 The employee
has the option to either proceed with the drug test or withdraw his
application for promotion. An employee who withdraws his applica-
tion will retain his present position without any adverse
consequences.14
An employee who elects to proceed with the drug test must
submit a urine sample for chemical analysis. t 5 The sample may be
produced behind a partition or in the privacy of a bathroom stall.' 6
However, in either instance, a monitor of the same sex will accom-
pany the employee in order to ensure against adulteration or substi-
tution of the urine specimen.1 7 The monitor does not observe the
employee urinate, but instead listens for the normal sounds of uri-
nation. 18 The monitor also inspects the sample's temperature and
color. 19
The urine sample is then tested for marijuana, cocaine, opiates,
amphetamines, and phencyclidine. 20 Initially, the samples are
tested by the enzyme-multiplied-immunoassay technique, otherwise
known as EMIT.2' Any sample testing positive is further tested by
gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS).22 If the GC/MS
confirms the positive result, the employee has the right to designate
an independent laboratory to test the original urine sample. 23 In
addition, since some lawful medications may affect the test results,
employees who test positive may then disclose any medical and pre-
scription information or other reasons for exposure to potentially
illicit drugs. 24 Employees who cannot offer a satisfactory explana-
tion for the positive test result are subject to removal from the
Service. 25
On behalf of current Customs Service employees, the National
Treasury Employees Union brought a suit challenging the constitu-
13 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5, Von Raab (No. 86-1879).
14 Id. The employee will not be dismissed from the Customs Service for refusing to
submit to the drug test. Id.





20 Id. at 1389.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 181 (5th Cir.
1987).




tionality of the Service's suspicionless drug testing program. 26 The
Union alleged that the program violated an employee's fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. 27 The dis-
trict court enjoined the program on the ground that the drug test
constituted an overly intrusive search without probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion and therefore, violated the employee's fourth
amendment rights.28
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court's decision.29 Although the court agreed that the drug testing
program constituted a search subject to the protections of the
fourth amendment, the court found the search to be reasonable.30
The court determined that the government's compelling interest in
not promoting drug users to sensitive positions outweighed the in-
terference with the employee's legitimate expectations of privacy
caused by the testing.3' The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether the fourth amendment was violated.3 2
III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Kennedy, in a five-to-four decision, delivered the major-
ity opinion of the United States Supreme Court.33 Justice Kennedy
observed that the protections of the fourth amendment apply even
when the government acts in an employer capacity.34 The Court
held that urinalysis testing constitutes a search within the meaning
of the fourth amendment since the urinalysis intrudes upon an indi-
vidual's reasonable expectations of privacy.3 5  To determine
whether the search was reasonable and hence constitutional under
26 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La.
1986).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 387.
29 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir.
1987).
30 Id. at 180.
31 Id.
32 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider "whether it violates the Fourth Amend-
ment for the United States Customs Service to require a urinalysis test from employees
who seek transfer or promotion to certain positions." National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989).
33 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1387. Justice Kennedy was joined by ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist and Justices White, Blackmun, and O'Connor.
34 Id. at 1390 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opin-
ion)); see O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring).
35 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1397 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109
S. Ct. 1402, 1412-13 (1989)).
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the fourth amendment, the Court balanced the competing interests
at stake. 36 After balancing the interference with privacy engendered
by the testing against the governmental interests in preventing the
promotion of drug users to sensitive positions,37 the Court con-
cluded that the government's need to conduct suspicionless urine
tests outweighed the employee's legitimate expectations of
privacy. 38
1. Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements
At the outset of its analysis, the majority stated the different
standards of review historically employed by the Court in assessing
the reasonableness of searches conducted by the government. 39
Justice Kennedy observed that a search must generally be supported
by a warrant based upon probable cause in order to be deemed rea-
sonable. 40 However, the majority noted that there is only a pre-
sumption that reasonable searches be conducted pursuant to a
warrant, not an irreducible requirement.4 1 The Court went on to
note that where a search "serves special governmental needs, be-
yond the normal need for law enforcement," the appropriate stan-
dard of reasonableness is determined by balancing the privacy
expectations of employees against the government's interest justify-
ing the search.42
Justice Kennedy observed that the drug screening program at
issue was "beyond the normal need for law enforcement" since the
test results could not be released to criminal prosecutors without
the employee's consent.43 According to the Court, the substantial
governmental interests in detecting and deterring the promotion of
drug users to sensitive positions presented a "special need" for
36 Id. at 1390.
37 The drug testing program covers positions that involve drug interdiction, the use
of firearms, or access to classified information. Id. at 1388. The majority did not assess
the constitutionality of the Service's drug testing program insofar as it covers employees
who have access to classified information. The case was remanded to the court of ap-
peals to determine whether the Service had included positions in this category that did
not involve access to classified information. Id. at 1397.
38 Id. at 1396.
39 Id. at 1390.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1413-14
(1989)). Justice Kennedy cited several cases where searches were deemed reasonable
despite the absence of a warrant, probable cause, or any measure of individualized suspi-
cion. These cases include Skinner, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989), New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325 (1985), and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).




After establishing that a special need existed for the urinalysis
testing, the majority employed the balancing test in order to deter-
mine the practicality of a warrant requirement. 45 The majority de-
termined that requiring the Customs Service to obtain a warrant
before every urine test was impracticable and would needlessly di-
vert valuable resources from the agency's primary mission.46 The
Court explained that a warrant was unnecessary because the pro-
gram's procedures satisfied the dual functions of a warrant. 47 The
primary purposes of a warrant are 1) to assure the individual that
the search is authorized by law and limited in its scope, and 2) to
reduce an inspector's discretion in determining who to search.48
The majority asserted that requiring the Service to obtain a warrant
would do little to further these goals. First, since all employees are
provided advance notice that their promotion is contingent upon
the successful completion of a drug test, the employees are already
informed of the search's legality and limited scope. Second, since
every employee's promotion to a sensitive position is contingent
upon passing the urinalysis test, there is no discretion concerning
who is required to take the test.49 Therefore, the majority con-
cluded that the warrant requirement was not the appropriate stan-
dard of legality. 50
Justice Kennedy next- considered the independent probable
cause standard. 51 The Court also dispensed with this require-
ment.52 Justice Kennedy noted that a probable cause standard "is
unhelpful in analyzing the reasonableness of routine administrative
functions especially where the Government seeks [1] to prevent the
development of hazardous conditions or [2] to detect violations that
rarely generate articulable grounds for searching any particular
place or person."53 The Court did not discuss the'relevancy of
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1391.
46 Id. at 1390.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1391.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1390-91.
52 Id. at 1391-92. Justice Kennedy cited several cases where the Court held that a
search was reasonable despite the absence of probable cause. These cases include Colo-
rado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976).
53 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1391-92 (emphasis in original) (citing Camara, 387 U.S. at
535-36; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557).
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these factors to the urinalysis scheme at this point in the opinion.
Nevertheless, the majority's later discussion of the petitioner's first
contention 54 encompasses these considerations. 55
2. Balancing the Competing Interests at Stake
The majority continued its analysis by thoroughly examining
the competing interests at stake. 56 The majority concluded that the
government's need to conduct suspicionless testing outweighed the
employee's expectations of privacy, and thus, the urinalysis tests
were constitutionally permissible.57
Justice Kennedy first inquired into the government's interests.
The Court found that the ultimate objective behind the drug testing
program was to prevent the promotion of drug users to sensitive
positions. 58 The Court focused on the subsidiary objectives of
urinalysis testing with respect to employees seeking drug interdic-
tion positions. The principal justification advanced was the interest
in maintaining the integrity of its work force.59 In particular, the
Court asserted that drug users are more susceptible to bribery,
blackmail, and misappropriating confiscated contraband for per-
sonal use.60 According to the majority, drug interdiction agents are
often exposed to drug traffickers and large quantities of illegal
drugs. 61 Therefore, a drug user's increased susceptibility to corrup-
tion could "facilitate importation of sizable drug shipments or block
apprehension of dangerous criminals." 62
Next, the Court assessed the government's interests in prevent-
ing the promotion of drug users to positions involving the use of
firearms. Suspicionless testing of such employees was upheld as a
legitimate means of enhancing public safety.6 3 The majority con-
tended that requiring drug users to carry firearms posed intolerable
risks to the employee, fellow agents, and the public since a drug-
related lapse of attention could have irreversible, disastrous
consequences. 64
54 Id. at 1395.
55 See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
56 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1392-94.
57 Id. at 1392. Presumably, the Court dispensed with the less stringent individualized
suspicion standard for the same reasons that it found the probable cause requirement
impracticable. See supra note 51-55 and accompanying text.
58 Id. at 1392-93.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1392.





As for the privacy interests of the Customs employees, the ma-
jority drew a distinction between these individuals and "most pri-
vate citizens or government employees in general." 65 The Court
found that employees subject to testing had expectations of privacy
considerably lower than that of most private citizens. 66 The major-
ity likened the Customs employees to members of the military or
United States Mint work force and contended that such employees
enjoy a diminished expectation of privacy by virtue of the special
ethical and physical demands of their occupation. 67 Since these jobs
require extraordinary fitness and probity, the testing scheme pro-
vides information directly relating to an applicant's competence. 68
Justice Kennedy therefore concluded that although the urinalysis
tests interfere with employee privacy interests, these interests are
outweighed by the government's interest in a drug-free Customs
Service. 69
3. Responding to the Employees' Union
Upon concluding the balancing of interests test, the majority
addressed two arguments raised by the National Treasury Employ-
ees Union.70 First, the majority rejected the Employees Union's
contention that drug testing is unreasonable because it was not im-
plemented in response to an existing drug problem within the Cus-
toms Service, and hence, was not predicated on the expectation of
detecting drug users. 71 Justice Kennedy emphasized that drug
abuse is prevalent throughout society. 72 According to the Court,
there is no reason to believe that "American workplaces," like the
Customs Service, are not affected by such a pervasive societal
problem. 73
65 Id. at 1394.
66 Id. at 1393-94.
67 Id. at 1393.
68 Id. at 1394.
69 Id. According to the majority, there are several factors that mitigate the program's
intrusiveness: 1) the absence of administrative discretion in determining who must sub-
mit a urine sample since every employee's transfer or promotion is contingent upon
successful completion of the drug test; 2) giving an employee advance notice of the test;
3) not requiring visual observation of the employee urinating; 4) restricting the chemical
analysis to only reveal the presence of a limited number of specified drugs; and 5) per-
mitting the employee to delay disclosing personal medical information, which may affect
the urinalysis results, until after the test result is positive. Id. at 1394 n.3.
70 The petitioner, National Treasury Employees Union, will hereinafter be called the
Employees Union.
71 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394.
72 Id. at 1395.
73 Id. (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989);
Masino v. United States, 589 F.2d 1048, 1050 (1978)).
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The Court also expressed doubt that Customs supervisors
could detect drug use by employees without urinalysis testing. First,
Customs Service employees operate in a unique environment; em-
ployees and their work product are not subject to daily scrutiny by
supervisors.74 Second, supervisors will be unaware of off-duty drug
use.75 Justice Kennedy noted that the government has a compelling
interest in ensuring that covered employees do not use drugs off-
duty since any drug use increases an employee's susceptibility to
bribery and blackmail. 76
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy contended that even if the Cus-
toms Service was drug-free, the government had compelling inter-
ests in preventing drug abuse from spreading to the Customs
Service.77 The majority emphasized that employing drug users in
sensitive positions could create "extraordinary safety and national
security hazards." s7 8 Justice Kennedy observed that a primary objec-
tive of the program was to avoid the promotion of drug users to
sensitive positions. 79 In this regard, the program was reasonable
even though most employees tested will have never used illicit
drugs.80 The Court concluded that the compelling governmental
interests in preventing drug abuse from spreading to the Customs
Service justified the drug testing program. 8'
The Court also rejected the second contention of the Employ-
ees Union. The Employees Union argued that urinalysis testing is
not " 'a sufficiently productive mechanism to justify its intrusion
upon Fourth Amendment interests' "82 because drug users can
avoid detection by abstaining from drug use after receiving notifica-
tion of their test date. The Court expressed doubt that an addict
could abstain from drugs for even a brief period of time.83 More-
over, the majority argued that a drug user is unlikely to know the
abstention period necessary to avoid detection.8 4 The length of
time that particular drugs remain detectable varies widely depend-




77 Id. at 1395 & n.3.
78 Id. For a description of the potential dangers of promoting drug users to sensitive
positions, see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
79 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1395.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1979)).





urine twenty-two days after ingestion.8 6 Thus, the majority rea-
soned that a drug user, abstaining after the test date is assigned, still
faces a significant risk of testing positive.8 7 The Court concluded
that the risk of being detected will deter drug users from seeking
promotions to sensitive positions.88
The majority concluded its opinion by briefly discussing the
Service's urinalysis testing as it relates to employees with access to
classified information.8 9 Although the majority agreed in principle
that the government has a compelling interest in protecting "truly
sensitive information,"9 0 the Court expressly avoided ruling on the
reasonableness of the Service's program with respect to this cate-
gory of positions. The majority questioned whether the Service may
have included positions in this category which do not in fact involve
the access to "truly sensitive information." 91 Thus, the Court re-
manded the case to the court of appeals with instructions to ex-
amine the criteria used by the Customs Service in determining what
information is classified and whom to test under this category. 92
B. DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Marshall dissented9 from the Von Raab holding for the
reasons stated in the following sources: 1) his own dissenting opin-
ion in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n;94 2) Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion in Von Raab;95 and 3) the dissenting opinion of
the circuit judge below in Von Raab.96
86 Id. (citations omitted).
87 Custom employees testing positive for drugs are subject to removal from the Ser-
vice. Id. at 1389.
88 Id. at 1396. The Court also stated that the precautions taken by the monitor at the
test site were sufficient to prevent an employee from adulterating the urine sample. Id.
For a discussion of the precautions employed by the sample collector, see supra notes
18-19 and accompanying text.
89 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1398.
90 Id. at 1396.
91 Id. at 1397. Justice Kennedy listed a number of positions which, based on the job
titles, did not appear to have access to truly sensitive information but, nevertheless, were
included in the urinalysis scheme. These positions include accountant, accounting tech-
nician, animal caretaker, attorney, baggage clerk, co-op student, electric equipment re-
pairer, mail clerk/assistant, and messenger. Id.
92 Id.
93 Justice Marshall was joined by Justice Brennan.
94 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1422-33 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see infra notes 97-113
and accompanying text.
95 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1398-1402 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see infra notes 114-150
and accompanying text.
96 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 182-84 (5th Cir.




1. Justice Marshall's Dissent
In Skinner,97 Justice Marshall began his dissent by flatly rejecting
the majority's viewpoint that the constitutionality of any govern-
ment search is appropriately analyzed under a balancing test when
"special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement makes
the requirement of probable cause impracticable."-9 8 Moreover,
with respect to the urinalysis scheme in question, Justice Marshall
found the majority's use of the special needs exception to the prob-
able cause requirement particularly egregious for two reasons.99
First, Justice Marshall observed that the special needs balancing
analysis had never been applied to highly intrusive searches aimed
"at a person and not simply the person's possessions."'' 00 Justice
Marshall criticized the majority's failure to set forth reasons justify-
ing this unprecedented application of the special needs framework
to a highly intrusive search. Justice Marshall contended that full-
scale searches, like the urinalysis scheme in question, must adhere
to the fourth amendment's textual requirement of probable
cause.10
Secondly, even if the probable cause standard was correctly re-
laxed, Justice Marshall contended that some level of individualized
suspicion is a prerequisite for a personal search to be deemed rea-
sonable under the special needs analysis.' 0 2 Justice Marshall con-
97 109 S. Ct. at 1422 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 1423 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court first applied the special needs
exception to the usual warrant and probable cause requirements in New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). Since T.L.O., the Court has applied the special needs
balancing analysis five times. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1384; Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at
1402; Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 (1987); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,
699-703 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721-25 (1987). Justices Marshall
and Brennan have joined dissenting opinions in each of these cases.
Justice Marshall noted that the majority's "special needs" exception is unsupported
by the text of the fourth amendment. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1423. In fact, the majority's
use of a multifactor balancing test ignores "the only standard [probable cause] that finds
support in the text of the Fourth Amendment." Id. Justice Marshall asserted that "with-
out the content which those provisions [warrant and probable cause requirements] give
to the Fourth Amendment's overarching command that searches and seizures be 'rea-
sonable,' the Amendment lies virtually devoid of meaning, subject to whatever content
shifting judicial majorities, concerned about the problems of the day, choose to give to
that supple term." Id. Justice Marshall relied on the following cases to illustrate the
dangers of deviating from textually based principles of the fourth amendment: Hiraba-
yashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (involving World War II relocation camps);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1919) (involving internal subversion during the
McCarthy-Era).
99 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1425 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 1424-25 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 1425 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall listed several cases sup-
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ceded that the Court has upheld searches in the absence of
individualized suspicion.10 3 However, he argued that those searches
were substantially less intrusive than urinalysis testing. 0 4 Justice
Marshall pointed out that even the majority recognized the intru-
siveness of urine testing in its explanation of why it constitutes a
search under the fourth amendment. 10 5 In addition to disclosing
drug use, urinalysis testing may also reveal personal information
concerning medication, medical disorders, and in the case of a wo-
man, pregnancy. 106 Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's
assertion that Customs employees subject to testing enjoy dimin-
ished expectations of privacy.' 0 7 He contended that privacy expec-
tations can only be reduced with respect to regulatory searches of
property and not searches of the person. 0 8 Therefore, in light.of
the intrusiveness of urinalysis testing, Justice Marshall contended
that the Customs Service's drug program must be based on individ-
ualized suspicion in order to be constitutional.' 09
porting the principal that individualized suspicion is a prerequisite of reasonable
searches under the special needs balancing analysis. These cases included T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 346 (teacher's observation of student smoking provided reasonable suspicion
that purse contained cigarettes), O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (charges of various financial
improprieties provided the employer with individualized suspicion of wrongdoing by the
employee), and Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875 (tip to parole officer that probationer was storing
firearms in his apartment provided reasonable suspicion).
103 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1424 n.2 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cited two
cases where the Court upheld searches despite any evidence of wrongdoing by the per-
son whose property was searched. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 523
(1976) (brief questioning at permanent border checkpoint to verify motorist's residence
status upheld); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (search by building
inspectors checking for compliance with regulations upheld).
104 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1427-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Many lower courts and
commentators have noted that requiring a person to submit a urine sample "intrudes
deeply on privacy and bodily integrity." Id. at 1428 (citing Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F.
Supp. 1422, 1433-34 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578,
586 (N.D. Ohio 1987); AFL-CIO v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 732-33 (S.D. Ga.
1986); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.NJ. 1986); Fried, Privacy,
77 YALE LJ. 475, 487 (1968)).
105 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1429 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at
1413). Justice Marshall criticized the inconsistency between the majority's initial view-
point and the majority's subsequent characterization of the interference with privacy
interests, caused by urinalysis testing, as minimal. Id. The majority initially stated:
"There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of
urine: Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a
function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its perform-
ance in public is generally prohibited by law and social custom."
Id. at 1429 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413 (quoting Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987))).
106 Id. at 1429 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107 Id. (Marshall, J, dissenting).
108 Id. at 1429-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 1430-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Justice Marshall concluded by expressing concern for the possi-
ble ramifications of the Court's holding. He argued that the Court's
attempt to limit its holdings in Skinner 110 and Von Raab "I would
prove ineffective since "principles of law, once bent, do not snap
back easily."' 12 Therefore, Justice Marshall concluded that the ma-
jority's replacement of the textually based fourth amendment war-
rant and probable cause requirements with a malleable special
needs balancing analysis and the discarding of the individualized
suspicion requirement will ultimately diminish the privacy enjoyed
by all citizens. 1 3
2. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia dissented from the Von Raab opinion. 114 In
weighing the competing interests at stake, Justice Scalia found dis-
positive the absence of any evidence of widespread drug use within
the Customs Service. 1 5 In addition, Justice Scalia argued that even
if such drug use did exist, it did not pose such enormous risks to
society to justify suspicionless urinalysis testing. 116
Justice Scalia drew upon the Court's decisions in New Jersey v.
T.L.O.,' 17 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,1" 8 and Skinner"19 to support
110 Id. at 1423 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414).
111 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1397-98 (1989)).
112 Id. at 1432 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
113 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting). justice Stevens joined injus-
tice Scalia's dissent. It is noteworthy that Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens concurred
with the majority in Skinner, the companion case, decided the same day as Von Raab.
115 Id. at 1398-1401 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116 Id. Justice Scalia stated:
What is absent in the Government's justifications-notably absent, revealingly ab-
sent, and as far as I am concerned dispositively absent-is the recitation of even a
single instance in which any of the speculated horribles actually occurred: an instance,
that is, in which the cause of bribe taking, or of poor aim, or of unsympathetic law
enforcement, or of compromise of classified information, was drug use.
Id. at 1399-1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search of student's purse in school upheld). The T.L.O.
Court relied upon an agency report to Congress that drug use and violent crimes had
become major social problems within schools. Id. at 339.
118 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (suspicionless search of cars for illegal aliens near the Mexi-
can border upheld). The Martinez Fuerte Court noted a report by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service which stated that " 'there may be as many as 10 or 12 million
aliens illegally in the country,' and that, 'interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from
Mexico poses formidable law enforcement problems.'" Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1399
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 551-52).
119 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (suspicionless
blood and urine testing of railroad employees involved in train accidents upheld). The
Skinner Court stressed the long history of alcohol abuse in the railroad industry and
noted that numerous drug and alcohol related accidents had occurred. Id. at 1407 n.1.
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his contention that suspicionless urinalysis testing was unreasonable
in the absence of an acute drug problem within the Customs Ser-
vice.120 Justice Scalia noted that in each of these cases, a well-docu-
mented problem existed among the class of individuals to be
searched.' 2 1 According to Justice Scalia, this generalized problem
rendered the government's search a reasonable method of protect-
ing society. 122
Justice Scalia contended that the instant case was distinguish-
able since there was no evidence of a drug problem within the Cus-
toms Service. 123 In response to the majority noting that several
Customs employees have been fired for accepting bribes or other
integrity violations, Justice Scalia pointed out that "none of these
incidents were related to drug use."' 124 Moreover, Justice Scalia ob-
served that even Commissioner Von Raab has stated that he " 'be-
lieve[s] that Customs is largely drug free,' [and] that '[t]he extent of
illegal drug use by Customs employees was not the reason for estab-
lishing this program.' "125 Given the absence of widespread drug
use within the Service, Justice Scalia argued that no special need
existed for mass urinalysis testing.' 26
Justice Scalia criticized the majority's reliance on the prevalence
of drug abuse in society at large to justify drug testing Customs em-
ployees.' 27 He argued that such a generalization was inappropriate
in the instant case.' 28 According to Justice Scalia, a special need for
suspicionless drug testing could exist without generalized suspicion,
but only if the potential harm of a drug impaired employee is "cata-
strophic."' 129 For example, Justice Scalia reasoned that a nuclear
power plant was one situation where "no risk whatever is tolera-
ble."' 3 0 He argued that the potential harm prevented by drug test-
ing Customs employees was clearly distinguishable from the
"catastrophic" harm of a nuclear power plant accident.131 In short,
Justice Scalia contended that the potential harm prevented by drug
120 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1398-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
126 Id. at 1398-1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cited Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power
Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988). In Rushton, the Court of Appeals for the Eight Cir-
cuit upheld suspicionless urine testing of nuclear power plant employees. Id. at 563.
131 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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testing Customs employees was insufficient to justify suspicionless
urinalysis drug testing.13 2
The second premise of Justice Scalia's dissent concerned the
relationship between drug abuse and the governmental interests al-
legedly furthered by urinalysis testing. 133 Justice Scalia stated that
"the connection between whatever drug use may exist and serious
societal harm [allegedly adverted by urinalysis testing] is entirely
speculative."' 134 Thus, even if widespread drug use existed within
the Customs Service, Justice Scalia doubted that such use would
pose sufficient dangers to warrant suspicionless urinalysis testing. 135
Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's contention that drug
users are more susceptible to bribery. 136 He argued that a drug
user is no more susceptible to being bribed by a drug smuggler than
an employee wearing diamonds is to being bribed by a diamond
smuggler. 137 Justice Scalia conceded that an addict would be more
likely to accept a bribe in order to support his habit. Nevertheless,
Justice Scalia asserted that any employee whose drug use was so se-
vere would be detectable without the use of urinalysis testing. 138
Justice Scalia also contended that drug users were not signifi-
cantly more likely to be unsympathetic to their drug interdiction du-
ties.' 39 He likened a drug-using Customs employee to a police
officer who speeds. Justice Scalia concluded that in both cases the
employees would still perform their law enforcement duties despite
their own breaking of the law. 140 Finally, Justice Scalia expressed
doubt that the risk of testing positive for drugs would deter gun-
carrying agents from using drugs. 141 He reasoned that any Customs
Service employee who was willing to go to work impaired by drugs
and risk being injured in combat with unimpaired smugglers would
not be deterred by the risk of testing positive on a urine test. 142
Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded that urinalysis testing is unnec-
essary, and hence, unreasonable in the present context until evi-
dence exists to support the majority's assertions that urinalysis
testing will significantly reduce bribery, blackmail, and misuse of
132 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 1399-1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 1399-1401 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 1399 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).




Justice Scalia argued that, in reality, the Customs Service's drug
testing program would prevent little harm to society and would
merely serve as a "symbolic opposition to drug use."1 44 In support
of this viewpoint, he referred to a statement by the Customs Service
Commissioner that "implementation of the drug screening program
would set an important example in our country's struggle with this
most serious threat to our national health and security."' 145 Justice
Scalia contended that setting an important example is an insufficient
justification for conducting a search which so significantly interferes
with an individual's privacy interests.' 46
Justice Scalia concluded by discussing the possible ramifications
of the Court's extremely broad holding. t 47 He argued that under
the majority's logic, any urinalysis drug testing program is reason-
able where the employees may endanger themselves or others if im-
paired by drugs. 148 Similarly, the Court's holding, inasmuch as it
expressed approval of drug testing employees who have access to
confidential information, exposes a vast number of governmental
employees to urinalysis testing.' 49 Thus, Justice Scalia expressed
doubt that the majority's attempt to limit the scope of its holding
would be effective.150
3. Judge Hill's Dissent Below
Justice Marshall also dissented in Von Raab for the reasons
stated in Judge Hill's dissenting opinion below.15' Judge Hill ini-
tially noted that the reasonableness of a search depends on whether
"the measures adopted will achieve the objectives of the search."' 152
According to Judge Hill, if the program is ineffective in achieving its
goals, there is no reason to interfere with employees' privacy
interests.153
143 Id. at 1398-1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 1401 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
145 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
146 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 1400-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 1401 (Scalia,J., dissenting). Justice Scalia listed a number of diverse occupa-
tions which he believed could be drug tested under the Von Raab holding. These occu-
pations included automobile drivers, operators of potentially dangerous equipment,
construction workers, and even school crossing guards. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 1399-1402 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
151 Id. at 1398 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 183 (5th Cir. 1987) (Hill, J., dissenting)).
153 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 184 (Hill,J, dissenting)).
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Judge Hill then contended that, for three reasons, the program
is an ineffective method for accomplishing the Service's goals. First,
Judge Hill argued that the urinalysis scheme is ineffective because it
fails to test employees currently occupying sensitive positions even
though this segment of the work force could include drug users.' 54
Although the program is likely to be expanded in the future to in-
clude these agents, Judge Hill stressed that the present program
must be examined on its own merits.' 55 Second, he criticized the
program because employees promoted to sensitive positions are
never retested. 156 Judge Hill asserted that the program would not
detect "clean" employees who become drug users after their
promotion. 1 57
Finally, Judge Hill argued that the program is ineffective since
drug users can avoid detection by briefly abstaining from drug use
prior to the test date.' 58 Judge Hill conceded that an addict would
be unable to abstain from drug use for even a brief period of
time.' 59 Nevertheless, he argued that an individual whose drug use
was so severe would be detectable without the assistance of a urinal-
ysis test.' 60 Judge Hill disagreed with the contention that a drug
user who briefly abstains from drug use still faces significant risks of
testing positive because some drugs remain detectable for longer
than the five day notification period.' 6 ' Judge Hill reasoned that an
employee can merely postpone applying for a promotion until he is
certain that the drugs are no longer detectable. After promotion,
the employee could resume using drugs without any possibility of
being tested again.' 62 Therefore, Judge Hill concluded that the
Customs Service's drug program will not prevent the promotion of
drug users to sensitive positions since it neither tests individuals
currently employed in such positions nor retests employees after
they have been promoted.' 63
IV. ANALYSIS
It is undisputed that drug abuse costs the United States billions
of dollars each year in terms of lost wages, law enforcement ex-
154 Id. (MarshallJ, dissenting) 'citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 184 (Hill,J., dissenting)).
155 Id. (Marshallj., dissenting) (citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 184 (Hill,J., dissenting)).
156 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 184 (Hill,J, dissenting)).
157 Id. (MarshallJ., dissenting) (citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 184 (Hillj., dissenting)).
158 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 184 (Hill,j., dissenting)).
'59 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 184 (Hill,J., dissenting)).
160 Id. (Marshall, J, dissenting) (citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 184 (Hill, J, dissenting)).
161 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 184 (Hill,J., dissenting)).
162 Id. (Marshall, J, dissenting) (citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 184 (Hill, J, dissenting)).
163 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citing Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 184 (HillJ., dissenting)).
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penses, and treatment.' 64 Indeed, drug use has reached such epi-
demic proportions that the country is waging a full-scale "war" on
drugs.1 6 5 Under the Court's Von .Raab decision, it appears that sus-
picionless drug testing is a constitutionally "reasonable" weapon in
the government's war against drugs. 166
However, there are substantial consequences associated with
suspicionless drug testing in terms of intrusions upon legitimate ex-
pectations of privacy and dignity traditionally afforded protection
under the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court's decision in Von
Raab, and perhaps more importantly its underlying reasoning, ap-
pears to afford little regard for drug testing's impact on these con-
stitutionally protected liberties. In particular, the majority's
conclusion is based upon three unsettling propositions. The first
proposition is that under a "special needs" noncriminal category of
searches, officials may discard the presumptive fourth amendment
requirement of probable cause without demonstrating that the stan-
dard would impair the objectives of the search. 167 Second, a cate-
gory of employees may be compelled to take urinalysis tests without
any individualized suspicion or evidence of a generalized drug prob-
lem within that category.' 68 Finally, a drug program is reasonable
even though employees control the occurrence and timing of the
test and, hence, can avoid detection by temporarily abstaining from
drug use.16 9 This Note will analyze each of these propositions as
well as the ramifications of the Von Raab decision.
A. DISPENSING WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND
INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION
The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause."' 70 Ultimately, a court must determine whether a
164 Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employees: Toward
a General Rule of Legality Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 201, 203 (1986).
165 In May 1988, the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate voted to give the
military a major role in halting the influx of illegal drugs across the nation's border. See
House to Enlist Military in Drug War, The Wash. Times, May 6, 1988; Senate Votes Military
Major Role in Drug War, The Wash. Post, May 14, 1988.
166 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1397-98.
167 See infra notes 170-195 and accompanying text.
168 See infra notes 214-223 and accompanying text.
169 See infra notes 224-236 and accompanying text.
170 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. A threshold determination of an; fourth amendment
analysis is whether an individual is entitled to any protection in the first place. Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1411 (1989); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 333-37 (1985). The Von Raab Court correctly found that urinalysis testing
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search fulfills the amendment's dictate of reasonableness. In most
cases, the amendment does not leave the selection of the appropri-
ate standard of reasonableness to the judgment of the courts. 171
The framers of the fourth amendment have already balanced the
competing interests and determined that in order for a search to be
reasonable, it must be based on a warrant or probable cause.1 72
However, in rare circumstances, where the search furthers special
governmental interests beyond the ordinary needs of law enforce-
ment and a warrant or probable cause requirement is likely to impair
the governmental objectives behind the search, courts are entitled
to substitute their own balancing test for that of the framers. 73
Identical requirements must be met before a court is entitled to dis-
card an individualized suspicion standard.' 74 If the government at-
tempts to dispense with these usual standards, it bears the burden of
establishing why it is necessary to do so.' 7 5
At the outset of its analysis, the majority correctly recognized
that a balancing test may be employed to determine whether the
urinalysis testing is reasonable if a special need exists and a warrant
and probable cause requirement is impracticable.' 76 Although the
majority discussed the special governmental needs for drug test-
ing, 177 the Court immediately turned to a balancing test without first
addressing the necessity of discarding the probable cause or individ-
ualized suspicion standard. The majority stated that a probable
cause standard is particularly "unhelpful in analyzing the reasona-
was a "search" and hence within the protective ambit of the fourth amendment because
employees have objectively legitimate expectations of privacy in their urine and the
wealth of personal information it contains. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989); see Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1411-13; Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). But see Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539,
1551-56 (6th Cir. 1988) (Guy., J., dissenting).
171 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
172 Id.; see O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987).
173 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390-91 (citing Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413-14); O'Connor,
480 U.S. at 720; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
174 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390.
175 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 182-84 (5th Cir.
1987) (Hill, J., dissenting); Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1436 (N.D. I11. 1987);
see Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1420 (discussing why reasonable suspicion standard would im-
pede employer's ability to obtain critical information concerning cause of serious train
accident); see also O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 720 (discussing why requirement of probable
cause is an inappropriate standard for evaluating the reasonableness of a public em-
ployer's search of an employee's desk). But see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60
(1979) (upholding body-cavity searches of prison inmates in the absence of probable
cause without discussing the necessity of dispensing with the probable cause
requirement).




bleness of routine administrative functions, especially where the
Government seeks to prevent the development of hazardous condi-
tions."' 178 Nevertheless, the Court failed to focus on the facts of this
case which rendered the probable cause standard impracticable. In-
stead, the majority unduly relied upon the civil nature of the urinal-
ysis testing.' 79 Justice Kennedy stated that simply because the drug
testing occurs in a noncriminal context, it is appropriate to deter-
mine the search's reasonableness "without reference to our usual
presumption in favor of the procedures specified in the Warrant
Clause."18 0
Justice Kennedy's declaration that the program's reasonable-
ness may be determined without any reference to the probable
cause standard is incorrect. This standard cannot be discarded sim-
ply because there is a civil justification for drug testing. 18 1 A court
must explain why adherence to the traditional standard is impracti-
cable before substituting its own balancing of interests for that of
the framers. 182
The crucial question left unanswered by the majority is why in-
dividual suspicion is not necessary before every urine test.'8 3 In-
deed, the only mention of individualized suspicion is when the
Court concluded that the balance of interests did not warrant this
requirement.' 8 4 However, concluding that the government's inter-
ests in drug testing outweigh the test's interference with privacy in-
terests does not justify dispensing with a requirement of
individualized suspicion. If the standard of individualized suspicion
is adequate for identifying substance-abusing employees, the Cus-
toms Service lacks an interest that justifies departing from this stan-
dard.185 Thus, it is not the interest in a drug-free work force that
should be weighed on the government's side of the balance, but
178 Id. at 1391-92 (emphasis in original) (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 535-36 (1967)).
179 Id. at 1391, 1397.
180 Id. at 1397.
181 The scope of protection under the fourth amendment is not limited to unreason-
able criminal searches. The amendment also protects against unreasonable civil investi-
gations conducted by the government. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109
S. Ct. 1402, 1425 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
334-35 (1985); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504-05 (1978); Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-
30. Even in an employment context there is a strong presumption in favor of probable
cause. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716-19 (1987).
182 See supra note 175.
183 For example, would a reasonable suspicion standard unduly impair the objectives
of the search? See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417-19.
184 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1392.
185 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 10.3[e], at 47-48 (Supp. 1988).
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rather the cost of including an element of probable cause or even
reasonable suspicion in the program.18 6 Otherwise, the governmen-
tal interest in having probable cause or individualized suspicion
standards would carry no weight at all in the balancing test.1 7
The majority cited three cases in which the Supreme Court has
upheld searches in the absence of individualized suspicion. 188 In
each case, the Court emphasized that an individualized suspicion re-
quirement would impair the governmental purpose behind the
search since articulable grounds for identifying violators were not
generated.' 8 9 In other words, a requirement of individual suspicion
was impracticable. 190
Although the majority neglected this crucial step, a careful anal-
ysis, nevertheless, reveals that an individualized suspicion require-
ment would frustrate the government's ability to achieve a drug-free
Customs Service. First, as noted in the companion case of Skinner,
"an impaired employee will seldom display any outward 'signs de-
tectable by the lay person or, in many cases, even the physi-
186 The cost of an individual suspicion requirement is the reduction in the deterrent
effect of the drug testing program caused by fewer drug users being detected. See New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 363 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187 Id.
188 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1392 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n,
109 S. Ct. 1402, 1415-17 (1989); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557
(1976); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967)).
189 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1416-19; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557; Camara, 387 U.S. at
535-36.
190 Two decisions illustrate this point. In Camara, the Court held that a warrant au-
thorizing an area-wide inspection of houses for municipal housing code violations did
not violate the fourth amendment. 387 U.S. at 536. Since most violations were not
observable from outside the residences, the Court concluded that a reasonable suspicion
requirement would be impracticable. Id. at 534-35. The Court stated that warrants
based upon appraisals of the conditions of the area as a whole or simply the passage of
time would be reasonable. Id.
On the other hand, in Delaware v Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1978), the Court held
that random spot checks by highway patrolman aimed at discovering unlicensed drivers
were unreasonable. In reaching this result, the Court recognized the state's interest in
promoting highway safety as "vital." Id. at 658. Nonetheless, the Court noted that stops
based on reasonable suspicion were an effective means of guarding the public interests
because drivers without licenses have a tendency to generate articulable grounds for
identifying themselves, in part by violating other traffic regulations. Id. at 659-60; see also
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-84 (1975)(random stops by border
patrol held invalid because "the nature of illegal alien traffic tend to generate articulable
grounds for identifying violators ... [and therefore] a requirement of reasonable suspi-
cion for stops allows the government adequate means of protecting the border").
The facts of Von Raab are similar to Camara and distinguishable from Prouse. In
Prouse, the wrongdoing which the government sought to avoid, driving without a license,
generated articulable grounds for identifying violators. Here, in contrast to Prouse, the
wrongdoing which the government seeks to avoid, illicit drug use, cannot be detected by
an observer. See infrq notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
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cian.'" 19 1 Secondly, many Customs employees, as well as their
work-product, are not subject to daily observation by their supervi-
sors and co-workers. 192 Thus, while an employee's use of illicit
drugs may give rise to suspicion in a traditional office environment,
such frequent contact is absent between Customs Service supervi-
sors and their subordinates.19 3 Finally, neither supervisors nor fel-
low employees likely will be aware of an employee's off-duty drug
use.
194
In sum, the Court'failed to emphasize whether the impractica-
bility of a probable cause or even individualized suspicion require-
ment was an essential element of a constitutional suspicionless drug
testing program. While Supreme Court precedent indicates that
this is of overriding significance, the Von Raab Court devoted sparse
attention to this issue. This may mislead subsequent courts to erro-
neously conclude that the practicality of a reasonable suspicion stan-
dard is only one of several factors to be weighed in the balance. 195
B. THE GOVERNMENT'S SIDE OF THE BALANCING TEST: BENEFITS OF
URINALYSIS TESTING--A FUNCTION OF TWO VARIABLES
After establishing that the Customs Service's purpose behind
urinalysis testing is beyond the ordinary needs of law enforcement
and that the probable cause and individualized suspicion require-
ment are impracticable, the Court must turn to a balancing test to
determine whether the search is reasonable. 196 The balancing test
requires the Court to weigh the privacy expectations of the individ-
191 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1419 (quoting 50 Fed. Reg. 31,526 (1985)); see Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Cambria City Transit Auth., 691 F. Supp. 898, 905 (W.D. Pa. 1988);
Mullholland v. Department of the Army, 660 F. Supp. 1565, 1569 (E.D. Va. 1987). But
see Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1438 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Capua v. City of Plain-
field, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D.NJ. 1986).
192 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1395.
193 Cf Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
194 For a discussion of why the government's interest encompasses an employee's off-
duty drug use, see infra note 201. See City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322,
1326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("marijuana causes severe long and short term physical,
mental and psychological effects" and thus the relevant time frame of drug use includes
one's off-duty drug use) (citations omitted); see also Yesavage, Leirer, Denari & Hollister,
Carry-Over Effects of Marijuana Intoxication on Aircraft Pilot Performance: A Preliminary Report,
142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1325-29 (1985) (contending that marijuana users may be unable
to perform complex tasks 24 hours after using the drug).
195 E.g., Harmon, 878 F.2d at 489. Harmon, decided after Von Raab, upheld a urinalysis
drug testing program similar to that involved in Von Raab. However, the Harmon em-
ployees worked in traditional office environments. Consequently, the court concluded
that "drug use is presumably more easily detected by means other than urine testing."
Id. Nevertheless, based on the holding in Von Raab, the court concluded that this factor
was merely relevant and not essential to a constitutional drug-testing plan. Id.
196 See supra note 173.
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ual employees against the governmental interests furthered by sus-
picionless urinalysis testing. 197 If the employee's privacy interests
are outweighed by the government's asserted interests, the search is
deemed reasonable. 198
The balancing inquiry has two reference points: the Court must
determine whether the search is 1) "justified at its inception"' 199
and 2) "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which jus-
tified the interference in the first place." 200 The search is consid-
ered reasonable if it satisfies both prongs of this test. In Von Raab,
the debate between the majority and Justice Scalia centered on
whether the government's urinalysis test was 'justified at its incep-
tion." Accordingly, this Note will focus exclusively on the first, rea-
sonableness at inception, prong.20 1
Historically, a search was justified at its inception where reason-
able grounds existed for suspecting that the search would turn up
the evidence sought. 20 2 Although such suspicion must generally be
directed toward a particular individual,20 3 the Court has held that a
197 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987) (citing United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 703 (1983)); see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402,
1414 (1989) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1978)).
198 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1421; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1397-98.
199 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726; NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (cit-
ing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
200 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
201 Under the second prong of the reasonableness test, the measures adopted must be
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive. T.L. 0.,
469 U.S. at 341-42. The Customs Service's drug program is reasonably related in scope
to its objectives. The Service has an interest in ensuring that employees who carry guns
will not be impaired by drugs while at work. Thus, the relevant question is whether
urinalysis testing can identify employees who are more likely to use drugs in a fashion
which impairs their on the job performance.
A positive urine test need not conclusively establish that an applicant will use drugs
while at work. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1421; see supra note 194. Instead, the test results
need only indicate that drug-impaired job performance is more or less probable. Skin-
ner, 109 S. Ct. 1421. An employee who tests positive is more likely to use drugs in a
fashion which impairs his job performance than an employee who has never used drugs.
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Cambria City Transit Auth. 691 F. Supp. 898, 907 (W.D.
Pa. 1988) (citations omitted). But see Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1431 (N.D.
Ill. 1987). The program is also reasonable in scope insofar as it covers applicants for
interdiction positions. Any drug use by a drug interdiction officer raises doubts con-
cerning the employee's integrity. Id. at 1437-39.
The drug program is not excessively intrusive since the method of conducting the
urine tests is generally reasonable. For a discussion of the factors which reduce the test-
ing's intrusiveness as much as is practicable, see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
202 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
203 Ybarra v. United States, 111 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979); see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 878 (1987) (tip to police officer that probationer was violating his parole by
storing guns in his apartment gave officer reasonable suspicion); O'Connor, 480 U.S. at
726 (charges of various financial improprieties provided employer with individualized
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generalized problem among the targeted class is sufficient to justify
a search at its inception.204 Thus, under Supreme Court precedent,
urinalysis testing would be justified at its inception if either individ-
ual suspicion existed or there was an acute drug problem within the
particular work force subject to testing.
However, in Von Raab, the Supreme Court implicitly incorpo-
rated a new factor into the determination of whether a search is jus-
tified at its inception.20 5 Instead of focusing exclusively on whether
individual or generalized suspicion of drug use existed, the
Supreme Court inquired into the potential societal harm sought to
be prevented by drug testing. 20 6 Under the Von Raab logic, the gov-
ernment's interest in conducting suspicionless searches is afforded
more weight in cases where the potential harm to society is great. 20 7
The majority was correct in considering the potential harm of a
drug-impaired Customs Service when determining whether the ben-
efits of drug testing outweigh its interference with an employee's
privacy interests. 208 However, the Court failed to assess the extent
to which the drug testing program in question would actually de-
crease the threat of such harm to society.20 9 In essence, the benefit
to society of urinalysis testing is a function of two variables. First,
the potential societal harm of a drug user occupying a sensitive posi-
tion must be determined. 210 Second, the drug program's effective-
suspicion of wrongdoing by the employee); T.L.O. 469 U.S. at 346 (teacher's report that
a student had been smoking provided reasonable suspicion that the student's purse con-
tained cigarettes).
204 Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1407 n.1; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 551-
52 (1976); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536 (1967); Jones v. McKenzie,
833 F.2d 335, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
205 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 & n.3.
(1989).
206 Id.
207 See Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (enormous
dangers associated with placing a drug user in the control room of a nuclear power plant
warrants random urinalysis drug testing).
208 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 377-79 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
State v. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d 158, 161 (Ind. 1986) (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50
(1979); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) ("[A]n important factor to
be considered when determining whether any exigency exists [to justify dispensing with
the warrant requirement] is the gravity of the underlying offense.").
209 Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1547 (6th Cir. 1988); see also Brief
of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, The
Public Employee Department, AFL-CIO and The American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioners at 14, Von Raab (No. 86-
1879) (" 'Consideration of the constitutionality' of a search 'involves a weighing' not
only of 'the gravity of the public concerns served by the [search],' but also of 'the degree
to which the [search] advances the public interest.' ") (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 50).
210 For a discussion of the potential harm to society of promoting a drug user to a
sensitive position, see infra note 223.
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ness at reducing this risk of harm must be analyzed.2 11 The Von
Raab majority neglected this second factor. Therefore, the next
portion of this Note will focus primarily on the effectiveness variable
and how it relates to the drug testing program in question.
The magnitude of the reduction in risk attributable to a drug
testing program depends on two factors: 1) the current level of
drug use within that employment sector,21 2 and 2) the efficacy of the
particular program at detecting and thereby deterring drug users
from seeking promotions.213 The Customs Service's drug testing
program was not implemented in response to any significant level of
drug use among its employees. Moreover, the advance notification
of when an employee will be tested allows substance-abusing em-
ployees to avoid detection by briefly abstaining from drug use.
Therefore, the program is not effective in the sense of reducing risk
of harm to society.
1. Lack of Evidence of Drug Use by Customs Employees
The first factor concerns the number of drug users who would
have sought promotions but for the drug screening program. Es-
sentially, this factor involves rudimentary cause-in-fact analysis. If
no drug users would have sought promotions in the absence of a
drug testing program, then such program has not reduced any po-
tential harm to society. Instead, the drug testing program has need-
lessly interfered with the privacy interests of many applicants. Thus,
it is important to assess the probability of detecting or deterring a
drug user from seeking a sensitive position in addition to consider-
ing the benefit to society of preventing such an employee's
promotion.
The majority unpersuasively argued that reasonable grounds
exist for suspecting a drug problem among Customs employees.21 4
211 If risk of the potential harm is not significantly decreased by the search, there is no
justification for the government interfering with employees' privacy interests. No bene-
fits, in the form of reduced risk of harm, ensue to society as a result of the government
conducting the search.
212 For a discussion of the lack of evidence of an existing drug problem in the Cus-
toms Service work force, see infrn notes 214-223 and accompanying text. In essence,
this factor is the reasonable suspicion standard which the Court relied upon in previous
decisions to determine whether a search was justified at its inception. For a discussion
of the reasonable suspicion standard, see supra notes 202-204 and accompanying text.
213 Employees who test positive for use of illicit drugs are subject to dismissal. Von
Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1389. However, this administrative penalty will only deter drug users
from seeking promotions if the program actually detects illicit drug use. For a discus-
sion of why the Customs Service's program will not detect drug users, see infra notes
224-236 and accompanying text.
214 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1395.
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The Court reasoned that the widespread use of illegal drugs in soci-
ety at large leads to the "logical" inference that some users may end
up employed in the Customs Service.215
However, there is no evidence which indicates that the preva-
lence of drug abuse in the general citizenry is also a problem in the
Customs Service.2 16 It is inappropriate to resort to national statis-
tics of a widespread societal problem to justify searching a particular
group, such as Customs employees. 21 7 This is particularly true
where the group has chosen a career in federal law enforcement and
has been singled out as deserving of promotions.2 18 Even the Com-
missioner of the Customs Service has repeatedly emphasized that
the Customs Service work force "is largely drug-free," and that
"[tlhe extent of illegal drug use by Customs employees was not the
reason for establishing this program." 219 Based on the lack of evi-
dence of on-the-job accidents or integrity violations attributable to
employee drug use, a more "logical" conclusion is that the Customs
Service's work force is largely drug-free. 220
Individuals are promoted to sensitive positions from the cur-
rent Customs Service work force. Since there is no evidence of
widespread drug use among current Customs employees, 221 it is un-
likely that a drug user would be promoted to a sensitive position
even in the absence of any drug testing. The potential gains to soci-
ety of mandatory drug.testing are substantially lower than if there
had been a serious drug problem. Unfortunately, the majority failed
to adequately discount the potential societal benefit of urinalysis
testing by the lack of evidence that a substantial number of Customs
Service personnel use drugs. 222 Thus, the majority has inflated the
215 Id.
216 Id. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218 But see Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1427 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
219 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220 See Amalgamated Transit Union v. Cambria City Transit Auth., 691 F. Supp. 898
(W.D. Pa. 1988).
221 See supra notes 214-223 and accompanying text.
222 The analogies drawn by the majority between suspicionless magnetometer
searches at airports and the Customs Service suspicionless urinalysis testing is flawed.
See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1395 n.3. Magnetometers were installed in airports in re-
sponse to a national hijacking crisis. Id. The majority responds that magnetometers
searches could rightfully be installed at any airport even if that particular facility had not
previously experienced hijacking problem. Id. This is undoubtedly correct. However,
the majority fails to recognize that airports are to some extent fungible when it comes to
being the victim of acts of terrorists. In this regard, the airline cases are analogous to
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1978). In Prouse, the Court based its determination
that Delaware had a "vital interest" in promoting public safety upon its roads on statis-
tics concerning motor vehicle accidents occurring throughout the United States. Id. at
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potential gains to society of implementing suspicionless drug testing
in this context.223
2. Degree to Which the Customs Service's Testing Program
Detects Drug Users
The second factor in assessing the benefits of urinalysis testing
concerns whether the Customs Service's program will actually de-
tect drug users who seek promotions to sensitive positions. Implicit
in this inquiry is the question of how often the drug tests will regis-
ter negative even though the employee uses illicit drugs. If users
can avoid detection, they will not be deterred from seeking promo-
tions. Therefore, without disparaging the gravity of the potential
658. The Prouse Court's reliance on national statistics was correct because there was no
reason to believe that Delaware drivers are more or less prone to be involved in an
automobile accident than residents of other states. Drivers in different states are fungi-
ble.
The instant case is unlike the airline hijacking cases and Prouse. Customs employees
are a unique subpopulation of the United States public. These individuals have chosen a
career in law enforcement. Moreover, the Customs work force is known throughout the
law enforcement community as having "noteworthy integrity." Brief for Petitioner at 7,
Von Raab (No. 86-1879) (citation omitted). Finally, only employees who have been
deemed worthy of promotions are subject to being tested. National Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 177 (5th Cir. 1987). For these reasons, the possi-
bility of a Customs Service employee using illicit drugs is significantly less than that of
the average citizen. Customs employees and private citizens, unlike airports or automo-
bile drivers, are not fungible. Therefore, the majority's analogy to suspicionless magne-
tometer searches at airports is critically flawed.
223 This Note does not assert that urinalysis drug testing can never be reasonable in
the absence of individualized or generalized suspicion of drug use. However, as the
level of suspicion of a drug problem decreases, the requisite potential harm to society of
a drug impaired employee increases. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539,
1545 (6th Cir. 1988). The danger to society of an impaired Customs agent is insufficient
to warrant suspicionless drug testing in the absence of reasonable suspicion of drug use.
The harm to society of drug users being promoted to sensitive positions may be
significant. This is especially true in the instance of a Customs employee carrying a
firearm. However, the risk of immense losses being imposed upon society is clearly not
present. For example, the risks imposed upon society by an impaired Customs officer
are not on the same level as exists with certain nuclear power plant employees. Rushton
v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988). The same is true with air
traffic controllers. National Ass'n of Air Traffic Specialists, No. a87-073 unpublished
slip op. (D.C. Alaska 1987).
In addition, an impaired Customs employee's activities do not routinely involve the
use of a gun. See Penny v. Kennedy, 846 F.2d 1563, 1567 (6th Cir. 1988). A Customs
agent will only need to discharge a firearm on rare occasions. In contrast, the daily
responsibilities of air traffic controllers, bus drivers, and train conductors bear directly
on a substantial number of public lives. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1384; Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Cambria City Transit Auth., 691 F. Supp. 898, 905 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
Given the lower potential harm associated with promoting drug users to sensitive posi-
tions, some degree of suspicion of drug use is necessary in order for a drug testing
program to be reasonable. See Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1547. However, no evidence of such
a problem exists here. See supra notes 216-220 and accompanying text.
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harm of a drug impaired Customs officer, it is also necessary to con-
sider the program's effectiveness. 224
Judge Hill's dissent below raised relevant arguments which the
Von Raab majority did not address. 225 In essence, the drug testing
program's inefficacy stems from the employee's ability to predict,
with certainty, the timing and the occurrence of his or her urine test.
Therefore, employees can abstain from using drugs to avoid any
possibility of detection. It is noteworthy thatJudge Hill's arguments
are based entirely on the particular procedures the Customs Service
adopted and therefore do not address the constitutionality of suspi-
cionless urinalysis testing in general. 226
The majority specifically discussed the urinalysis scheme's effi-
cacy in addressing the petitioner's second contention. 227 The ma-
jority argued that users will be unaware of the fadeaway effect of
certain drugs.228 This assumption is tenuous at best. Indeed, in
Skinner, the Court implicitly recognized that urinalysis cannot serve
as an effective deterrent if employees are able to predict when they
will be tested. 229 Customs Service employees are not only aware of
when they will be tested but actually control the occurrence of the
event by applying for promotions to sensitive positions.230
The majority responded that since some drugs remain detecta-
ble in urine for up to twenty-two days, employees cannot avoid de-
tection by simply abstaining from drugs after the test date is
assigned.231 However, the majority's use of a twenty-two day fade-
away period is misleading. Many highly addictive drugs such as co-
caine, amphetamines, barbiturates, and heroin can only be detected
for up to five days after ingestion. 23 2 Thus, the more dangerous
drugs, which pose the greatest risks of employee corruption and job
224 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The Court must weigh the
"government's need for effective methods" to promote public order. Id. at 337 (emphasis
added).
225 Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 182-84 (5th Cir. 1987) (Hill,J., dissenting). For a discussion
of Judge Hill's dissent, see supra notes 15 1-163 and accompanying text.
226 For example, Judge Hill's arguments cannot be extended to the companion case of
Skinner because in Skinner, employees did not know when they would be tested. 109 S.
Ct. at 1420. In Skinner, employees were tested after a serious train accident "which no
employee could predict with certainty." Id. The Skinner Court expressly recognized that
the inability of an employee to predict when he or she would be tested was crucially
important to increasing the deterrent effect of urinalysis testing. Id.
227 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1396. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
228 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1396.
229 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1420; see also supra note 226.
230 Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 177.
231 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1396.
232 Joint Appendix of Petition for Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit at 7, Von Raab (No. 86-1879).
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impairment, have fadeaway periods considerably less than twenty-
two days.
Moreover, the majority completely failed to consider the realis-
tic possibility of users abstaining from drugs before the test date is as-
signed. Employees are generally notified of vacancies over a month
before a selection for a replacement is made.233 Thus, employees
can abstain from drug use for a brief period of time before submit-
ting their applications for promotions. Since employees are never
tested again, users can resume taking drugs immediately after a
urine sample is submitted.234
The majority's conclusion that "avoidance techniques . . .are
fraught with uncertainty" 235 is clearly erroneous. Drug users can
avoid any possibility of detection. The employees control whether
they will be tested, and if so, when the testing will occur. Therefore,
urinalysis drug testing will not reduce the risk of harm to society
because the procedures adopted by the Custom Service allow users
to avoid detection. 236
C. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF VON RAAB
Von Raab suggests that public as well as private employees may
be required to submit to drug testing whenever the government has
a compelling interest in ensuring that such employees do not use
illicit drugs. 237 The Von Raab decision has eliminated reasonable
suspicion of drug use as a prerequisite of a constitutional drug test-
ing program. 238 The relevant inquiry is the prevalence of drug
abuse in society at large. 23 9 If the current level of illicit drug use in
the United States is sufficient to warrant drug testing Customs em-
ployees, it likewise justifies testing other employees.
In determining the possible ramifications of the Von Raab deci-
sion, it is most important to assess the governmental interests in
conducting the drug test. The privacy interests of individuals occu-
233 Id.
234 Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 184 (Hill, J., dissenting).
235 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1396.
236 The majority correctly concluded that chronic drug users will be unable to abstain
from drugs for even a brief period of time. Thus, urinalysis will detect these drug users.
Nevertheless, individuals whose drug use is so severe will be detectable even without the
aid of urinalysis testing. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1399 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord
Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1437-38 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
237 Although Von Raab involved public employees, the majority's analysis can logically
be extended to include private employees. E.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989) (federal regulations mandating suspicionless drug testing
of privately owned railroad employees upheld).
238 See supra notes 202-211, 214-220 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
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pying positions in which the government has a weighty interest are
likely to be comparable to the interests of Customs employees in
Von Raab. These individuals, like the Customs employees seeking
transfers, will have a diminished expectation of privacy by virtue of
their employment in positions where the government has such a
weighty interest in drug testing.240 Thus, subsequent adjudication
will predominately focus on the government's interest in conducting
a search as opposed to the search's interference with privacy inter-
ests of individuals. 241
1. Integrity
In Von Raab, the government's first asserted interest was main-
taining the integrity of its work force.242 In discussing this interest,
the Supreme Court emphasized that Customs employees who were
unsympathetic to the war on drugs because of their own drug use
could jeopardize the Service's interdiction mission. 243 This reason-
ing applies equally to anyone involved in apprehending and prose-
cuting drug offenders. Thus, under the Court's analysis, drug
testing can legitimately be required of police officers, 244 judges, leg-
islators, and attorneys who prosecute drug cases245 since these indi-
viduals all have substantial roles in the country's war on drugs.
Indeed, the downside risk ofjudges or legislators who are unsympa-
thetic to the war on drugs is disproportionately large and may pose
even greater risks than unsympathetic interdiction agents at issue in
Von Raab.2
46
240 For a discussion of the Customs Employee's diminished expectation of privacy, see
supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
241 See, e.g., Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Harmon, which
specifically relied on Von Raab, focused exclusively on the governmental interests al-
leged to justify a suspicionless urinalysis testing program. Although the court deter-
mined that the drug testing program was constitutional, it never mentioned the test's
interference with an individual's privacy interests.
242 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1392.
243 Id.
244 Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (Ist Cir. 1989).
245 See Harmon, 878 F.2d at 490-91.
246 An unsympathetic judge may pose greater risks than a compromised Customs
agent for three reasons. First, in the case of a compromised Customs agent, the losses,
although significant, are not irretrievable since a smuggler may still be arrested by other
law enforcement personnel. See Penny v. Kennedy, 846 F.2d 1563, 1567 (6th Cir. 1988).
A judge's bias will influence the trial of an accused drug offender. The losses are irre-
trievable since double jeopardy will prevent a drug trafficker from being tried again.
Second, at the trial level, more resources have been devoted in terms of prosecutors
obtaining additional evidence and preparing for trial. Finally, judges as well as legisla-
tors are subject to considerable scrutiny by the press. The ensuing publicity could be
substantial if ajudge or legislator was found to be an illicit drug user. The government's
efforts to eliminate the use of illicit-drugs depends on convincing the public that drugs
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The fact that many of these positions involve substantial re-
sponsibilities unrelated to the country's war on drugs is irrele-
vant.247 Although the national crisis caused by illicit drug use is
important,248 it is clearly not the only threat to national security
which the United States faces. Judges and legislators deal with a
large variety of equally important issues. For example, the major-
ity's reasoning applies with equal force to these individual's duties
which affect the nation's economy or military. Thus, the integrity
rationale adopted by the Von Raab majority may logically be ex-
tended to encompass the drug testing of any individual who, if cor-
rupted by drugs, could raise comparable risks to national security.
2. Public Safety
An even broader scope attaches to the public safety rationale
adopted by the majority. 249 The requisite level of "safety interests"
to warrant suspicionless urinalysis testing of public employees is de-
termined by reference to the Court's approval of testing Customs
agents who carry firearms. Undoubtedly, a number of duties raise
comparable public safety concerns if performed by a drug impaired
employee. For example, drug impaired fire fighters, 250 police of-
ficers, 251 civilians employed at military weapons plants, 252 school
crossing guards, 253 construction workers, 254 and employees in-
volved in mass transportation 255 pose similar risks to public safety.
Moreover, many categories of employees pose greater potential
harm to society than Customs agents carrying firearms for two rea-
sons. First, Customs officers will seldom use their firearms. 256
Thus, an impaired Customs officer will rarely jeopardize anyone's
are extremely dangerous. Harmon, 878 F.2d at 497-98 (Silberman, J., dissenting). When
a high ranking official, such as a judge or a legislator, is found to be a drug user, the
government looses credibility and the probability of eliminating drugs from society is
decreased. Id. (Silberman, J., dissenting).
247 But see Harmon, 878 F.2d at 490-91.
248 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1392
(1989); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985); United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561-62 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
249 For a discussion of the public safety rationale, see supra notes 63-64 and accompa-
nying text.
250 Brown v. Winkle, 715 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
251 Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1989).
252 Thompson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989).
253 Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1401 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254 Id.
255 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (train conduc-
tors); Jones v. Jenkins, 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (bus drivers).
256 See Hartness v. Bush, 712 F. Supp. 986, 988 (D.D.C 1989); Penny v. Kennedy, 846
F.2d 1563, 1566-67 (6th Cir. 1988).
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safety. In contrast, society depends on the daily unimpaired judg-
ment of bus drivers and train conductors, for example. 257 Secondly,
the magnitude of potential losses resulting from a drug-related bus
or train accident is also substantially larger than the damage result-
ing from a poorly used firearm. 258 Therefore, under the public
safety rationale, several categories of employees may be required to
submit to urinalysis drug testing.
3. Sensitive Information
The government may conduct suspicionless drug testing in or-
der to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of "truly sensitive infor-
mation. '259 Unfortunately, the Court did not indicate what level of
sensitivity is a sufficient predicate for drug testing.260 Nevertheless,
the level of national security interest contemplated by the Von Raab
Court can be estimated by reference to the cases which the majority
chose to cite.26 1
Department of the Navy v. Egan262 was the principal case cited in
support of the confidentiality rationale. In Egan, the Court upheld
the Navy's denial of the security clearance of a civilian employee
seeking employment as a machinist at a nuclear submarine repair
facility.263 The unauthorized disclosure of information at issue in
Egan posed a potential threat to national security since the subma-
rines played a crucial role in the nation's defense system. The
Court's selection of Egan in addition to its emphasis that the mate-
rial must be "truly sensitive" indicates that the information at issue
must pose potential risks to national security in order to justify drug
testing every employee with access to such information. 264 There-
fore, although Justice Scalia was correct in asserting that other fed-
eral employees may be required to submit to urinalysis testing
257 Amalgamated Transit Union, v. Cambria City Transit Auth., 691 F. Supp. 898, 904
(W.D. Pa. 1988); see Penny, 846 F.2d at 1566-67.
258 Amalgamated Transit, 691 F. Supp. at 904; see Penny, 846 F.2d at 1566-67.
259 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1396-97
(1989).
260 Id. at 1401 n.l (Scalia, J., dissenting); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 491-
92 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
261 Harmon, 878 F.2d at 491-92; Hartness v. Bush, 712 F. Supp. 986, 991-92 (D.D.C.
1989).
262 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
263 The navy revoked the security clearance after discovering that Egan had been con-
victed for assault and for carrying a loaded firearm. Id. at 521.
264 See Harmon, 878 F.2d at 491-92; Hartness, 712 F. Supp. at 991-93. Many govern-
ment employees have access to some confidential information. However, if this was a
sufficient predicate for a drug testing program, the Von Raab Court would have em-
ployed a broader rationale. Harmon, 878 F.2d at 496 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
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under the confidentiality rationale, the extension to such employees
is clearly not as broad as he contends .265
V. CONCLUSION
In Von Raab, the Supreme Court significantly limited the role of
probable cause and individual suspicion in determining the reasona-
bleness of searches conducted for noncriminal purposes. The ma-
jority unduly relied on the noncriminal purpose of the urinalysis
drug testing in justifying its use of the balancing of interests test.
The Court did not clearly articulate its reasons for replacing the
usual fourth amendment standards with a balancing test. However,
this step determines whether a court is entitled to substitute a bal-
ancing test for the traditional probable cause standard. Although
such reasons did exist in the instant case, the Court's conclusion
that the balancing test is the rule as opposed to the exception is
clearly erroneous.
In assessing the benefits of the Customs Service's drug testing
program, the majority failed to consider the extent to which urinal-
ysis testing will actually decrease the risk of any potential societal
harm. There is no evidence of an existing drug problem within the
Customs Service. Furthermore, the employees' ability to control
the occurrence and timing of the testing enables users to abstain
and thereby cleanse their systems of drugs before taking the test.
Both factors indicate that the Customs Service's program will at best
only minimally reduce any risk of harm to society. Even if promot-
ing a drug user to a sensitive position endangers governmental in-
terests, these dangers are not of sufficient magnitude to justify drug
testing in the absence of any evidence of drug use among Customs
employees.
Undoubtedly, the Von Raab decision will be heavily relied upon
to determine whether other categories of employees can be consti-
tutionally drug tested. The integrity rationale adopted by the Von
Raab majority may logically be extended to encompass drug testing
any individual, who if corrupted by drugs, could raise comparable
risks to national security. Risks to national security which are unre-
lated to the government's war on drugs may still justify the imple-
mentation of suspicionless drug testing. Urinalysis drug testing is
also a reasonable method of enhancing public safety whenever drug
impaired employees may endanger themselves, co-workers, or the
265 In short, Justice Scalia predicted that "vast numbers of public employees" could
be required to take urinalysis tests under the majority's reasoning. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct.
at 1400-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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public at large. Moreover, drug testing is reasonable even though
an employee will seldom perform duties which require unimpaired
judgment. Finally, the Supreme Court expressed approval of drug
testing individuals with access to confidential information. The in-
formation at issue must pose potential risks to national security in
order to justify drug testing every employee with access to such
information.
This Note has adopted an extremely analytical approach in re-
viewing the Supreme Court's Von Raab decision. Libertarians, like
Justices Marshall and Brennan, are quick to criticize such cost-bene-
fit calculations when considering an individual's fourth amendment
rights.266 While such arguments clearly have some merit, a balanc-
ing of interests test, which now appears well-entrenched in fourth
amendment jurisprudence, requires such an analysis: does the end
(reducing risk of drug users occupying sensitive positions) justify
the means (urinalysis testing and its corresponding intrusion on pri-
vacy interests of individual workers). This Note concludes that even
under the utilitarian standards inherent in the majority's balancing
test, the Customs Service's drug testing program is a constitution-
ally "unreasonable" weapon in the nation's war on drugs.
KENNETH C. BErrs
266 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1423 (1989) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 369-70 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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